[Auto Probe] layout in China 40 years ago, Volkswagen aiming at Japanese automakers?　

　　哈恩說，我們知道整個中國汽車工業(yè)爆發(fā)性的增長是在更晚的時候出現，但是我們早期奠定的這樣一套基礎設施，為后來爆發(fā)式的增長奠定了良好的基礎。

　　70年代下半葉，大眾汽車集團在亞洲創(chuàng)建第二根支柱的考慮漸漸成熟起來。　　

　　Hahn said, “as we all know, the explosive growth of the entire Chinese automotive industry came much later, but the infrastructure that Volkswagen built early on laid a good foundation for the boom followed.”

　　In the second half of 1970s, Volkswagen Group’ s thought of building the second mainstay in Asia gradually matured.

Carl Horst Hahn, the former Chairman of the Volkswagen Group

　　在汽車業(yè)界，但凡談到改革開放，談到引進技術，談到合資合作，談到國產化……就不能不談到德國大眾。由此，記者也被一個“謎”一樣的問題所困擾：早在40年前，當幾乎所有的跨國公司都對中國汽車工業(yè)說“NO”的時候，大眾汽車為什么“不遠萬里，來到中國”？難道大眾汽車是那個時代的白求恩嗎？當然不可能，那又是為什么呢？　　

　　In the automotive industry, whenever it comes to the reform and opening-up, technology acquisition, joint venture and cooperation, and localization... The Volkswagen pops up spontaneously. Therefore, as a reporter, I am also troubled by a “mysterious” question: as early as 40 years ago, when almost all multinational companies said "NO" to the Chinese automotive industry, why Volkswagen came all the way to China? Was Volkswagen the Bethune of the age? Of course not, but why?

　　2018年，在紀念改革開放40周年時，記者對于這一謎題的破解也更加執(zhí)著。12月中旬的一個午后，在北京老皇城根下的一個茶館內，經濟日報-中國經濟網記者有機會向大眾汽車集團前董事長卡爾-H-哈恩做了求證�！�

　　In the year of 2018, as marking the 40th anniversary of the reform and opening-up, I become more persistent in solving this mystery. In one afternoon of mid-December, I, a reporter of Economic Daily-China Economic Net, took the chance to verify my confusions to Carl Horst Hahn, the former Chairman of the Volkswagen Group, in a teahouse in Beijing.

　　記者的問題是：1982年-1992年，在哈恩博士擔任大眾汽車董事長期間，對于大眾汽車進入中國市場，業(yè)界有兩種截然不同的說法：　　

　　My question: during Dr. Hahn's tenure as the Chairman of Volkswagen from the year 1982 to 1992, there were two completely different opinions about Volkswagen’s entering the Chinese market:

　　一個說法是迫于當時的國際形勢，比如歐美國家對南非的制裁，以及集團內部的調整和其他考量，大眾汽車不得不做出到亞洲投資的選擇；并且由于在韓國的投資沒有談成，最后才把項目落在中國�！　�

　　One theory is that forced by the international situation at that time, such as the sanctions imposed by European and American countries against South Africa, the adjustments within the group and other considerations, Volkswagen had to make the choice of investing in Asia. Besides the failed negotiation with South Korea, the project was finally placed in China.

　　還有一種說法是在那個日本汽車開始風靡全球的年代，大眾集團和哈恩博士就有歐美汽車企業(yè)一致的想法——抵制和對沖日本車企，為此就把戰(zhàn)線前移到亞洲（最早是想在韓國投資），前移到中國。那么，事實到底是怎樣的？　　

　　Another theory is that in the age of Japanese cars, Volkswagen Group and Dr. Hahn had the same thoughts with European and American automotive companies -- boycotting and hedging Japanese auto enterprises, so as to move the front line to Asia (Original idea is investing in South Korea) and to China. Then what's the truth on earth?

　　哈恩博士聽后笑著回答：兩種說法都是錯的，我很高興地告訴大家！說完他又大笑了一次�！　�

　　Dr. Hahn laughed and said, “I am glad to tell you both theories are wrong!” Then he laughed again.

　　當然，在此次向哈恩博士當面求證過程中，記者所提問題也并非主觀臆斷。其中，第一個：迫于內外部形勢，“不得不做出到亞洲投資的選擇”之說，是來自日本汽車界人士的看法，也并非完全是出于詆毀或其他惡意。此次提問哈恩博士，當經濟日報-中國經濟網記者說出這一說法的出處，引得現場一片笑聲。而第二個：“抵制和對沖日本車企，為此就把戰(zhàn)線前移到亞洲（最早是想在韓國投資），前移到中國”之說，則是有哈恩自己和自己人的“佐證”�！�

　　Of course, in the interview with Dr. Hahn, the questions raised by reporter are not subjective assumptions. The first theory: forced by the external circumstances, “having no other choice but investing in Asia” is coming from a Japanese auto industry personnel, not originated from entire slander or other malice. As the reporter of Economic Daily-China Economic Net gave the sauce of the statement, the scene burst into laughter. The second theory: "boycotting and hedging Japanese auto enterprises, so as to move the front line to Asia (Original idea is investing in South Korea) and to China” is "proved" by Hahn and his colleagues.

　　講到當年美國政府的政策，大眾汽車集團與美國政府之間保持了適當的距離與合理的關系，與他們之間也沒有任何問題，也不是我們考慮的因素。當時我們到中國來，是很幸運的，因為當時只有我們作為跨國汽車企業(yè)愿意到中國來。當時，絕大多數西方人都認為按中國社會當時的制度與狀況，是不可能成功的，而且中國如果要發(fā)展汽車工業(yè)，也缺乏所需要的知識、技術等�！�

　　Speaking of the policies of the US government at that time, Volkswagen Group maintained a proper distance and reasonable relationship with the US government, and there was no issue between us, nor was it a factor we considered. As the only multinational auto company willing to China, we were lucky. Most westerners believed it was impossible to succeed under Chinese social system and status of the time, and China also lacked the necessary knowledge and technology to develop automotive industry.

　　哈恩說，我們與合資伙伴開始合作時，雙方都沒有退路，沒有人給我們兜底，冒著巨大的風險�！　�

　　Hahn said, when we started cooperation with our joint venture partners, neither side had a way out, and with no back-up, we both took enormous risks.

　　他分析道，我們和日本情況不一樣。當時這個市場，在沒有其他人來的情況下，我們就先來了。第一年做下來，賣了五千輛車，就占到整個市場份額的27%。當時有一些人不認同我的做法，說這樣的市場沒有任何的發(fā)展前景與空間，但是我仍然決定堅持，而且在與中方的合作中，我們發(fā)現中國人的學習速度非�？臁Ｍ瑫r，在與他們的合作中，我們也學習到很多東西。此外，還有一個非常重要的因素，中國政府的領導人不是由空想家或者拘泥于過去，他們中的大部分有理工科背景，都是工程師出身，而且非常急切地去學習外部世界的先進經驗與最佳實踐。（注：對于上海大眾成立初期的產銷量，經濟日報-中國經濟網記者在《汽車工業(yè)規(guī)劃參考資料1996》等資料中查閱到：1985年至1987年，上海大眾的產量分別為1733輛、8031輛和11000輛；同期，全國轎車產量分別為5207輛、12297輛和20865輛；上海大眾三年占比分別為33.28%、65.31%和52.72%。盡管缺乏當時的銷量數據，但上海大眾第一年的產銷量顯然沒有5000輛的規(guī)模；且產量在全國產量的“占比”數均遠高于哈恩博士所說“市場份額的27%”）�！　�

　　We are different from Japan, Hahn argued. When no one entering the market, we came first. 5000 cars were sold in the first year, accounting for 27% of the total market share. At that time, some people disagreed with my approach, saying such market had no development prospect and growth potential; however, I still decided to stick to it. Chinese are quick learners. In collaboration with Chinese side, we acquired knowledge simultaneously. Moreover, there is another significant factor. Chinese government leaders are not just daydreamers or sticking to the past. Most of them have science and engineering backgrounds and are eager to learn advanced experiences and best practices from the world. (Notes: based on the information the reporter of Economic Daily-China Economic Net found in Automobile Industry Planning Reference 1996: from the year 1985 to 1987, Shanghai Volkswagen produced 1733, 8031, and 11000 vehicles, respectively. During the same period, the domestic production of passenger cars was 5270, 12297, and 20865, in which the Shanghai Volkswagen proportion accounting for 33.28%, 65.31% and 52.72%, respectively. Despite the lack of sales data of the time, the production and sales volume in the first year was apparently not as large as 5000. And the “proportion” in the domestic production is far higher than what Dr. Hahn said-27% of the market.)

　　哈恩強調，我們在中國整個發(fā)展過程也是小規(guī)模的起步，按部就班，緩慢地向前推進。但是，我們非常注重為后面的發(fā)展奠定一套堅實的基礎設施，到我25年前退休時，（大眾汽車在）中國的產量僅僅達到10萬輛，我們知道整個中國汽車工業(yè)爆發(fā)性的增長是在更晚的時候出現，但是我們早期奠定的這樣一套基礎設施，為后來爆發(fā)式的增長奠定了良好的基礎。像今天，中國汽車產業(yè)的規(guī)模已經達到了三千萬輛，我們也有420萬輛的規(guī)模（注：哈恩博士退休的1992年，上海大眾生產桑塔納轎車65000輛，而1993年才達到100001輛，資料來源同上）。　　

　　Hahn stressed that Volkswagen started with small scale and moved forward slowly step by step in China. However, we attached great importance to laying a solid infrastructure for the future development. By the time I retired 25 years ago, Volkswagen’s output in China was only 100000.

　　As we all know, the explosive growth of the entire Chinese automotive industry came much later, but the infrastructure that Volkswagen built early on laid a good foundation for the boom followed. At the present, the production of China’s automotive industry has reached 30 million, while Volkswagen achieved 4.2 million. (Notes: in 1992, when Dr. Hahn retired, Shanghai Volkswagen produced 65000 Santana cars, and it was not until 1993 that the production reached 100001. Ibid) （文：經濟日報-中國經濟網記者 張宇星 譯：張懿）

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